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Abstract 
In line with the large-scale reforms instituted by the New Zealand government in the 1980s, the New Zealand post 
office was broken up and a state owned enterprise (SO£), the Telecom Corporation of New Zealand (TCNZ), was 
formed in 1987. In 1990 TCNZ was fully privatised with the major shareholders, Bell Atlamic and Ameritech, being 
US owned companies. There followed a decade of organisational and structural change. Between 1990 and 2000 the 
fulltime workforce at TCNZ was reduced from 16 000 to less than 6000 fulltime workers as the firm evolved into a new 
leaner model (TCNZ annual reports ). Such workforce reductions were largely achieved through outsourcing and the 
introductidn of new technologies. But the scale of downsizing at TCNZ raises questions about the possible loss of core 
knowledge and the long-term sustainability of these strategies. Transaction costs associated with 'relationship man-
agement' -such as, the coordination and monitoring of outsourced work - may also reduce their effectiveness. This 
paper draws on transaction costs economics (TCE) and downsizing theories to help explain why firms may choose to 
either outsource their transactions to the marketplace or pe1:form them in-house. It further examines what the implica-
tions ofTCE may be for employment relations (ER). This paper suggests that a number of additional factors outside of 
the traditional TCE analysis also contributed to the restructuring and ER strategies at TCNZ. These included, short-
term profit considerations, the size of the New Zealand telecommunications market, TCNZ's cominued dominance of 
its domestic market and the desire to form strategic alliances. Therefore, these additional factors may need to be 
integrated into the TCE framework if it is to provide a possible model that will assist in analysing the changing 
workforce structure at TCNZ since deregulation. 
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After privatisation in 1990, the Telecom New Zealand 
Corporation (TCNZ) substantially reduced the size of its 
full-time work:force - by 2000 the number of fu ll-time 
workers was about one third of the level of 10 years ago. 
This process saw much of its work o~tsourced, with a 
concomitaJ1t increased reliance by the firm on 
subcontrators and strategic alliances. A number of inter-
nal and external factors can be Linked to these strategies. 
Internal factors include the ability to shift workers into 
subsidiaries, joint ventures and stand alone companies, 
and TCNZ 's ownership of much of the New Zealand tel-
ecommunications infrastructure. External factors include 
government legislation and policy, the nature of the la-
bour market for different groups of skilled workers, the 
nature of new technologies, and the rapidly changing/ 
evolving nature of the telecommunications market. 
This paper is part of a longitudinal study that is examin-
ing such changes in the organisational and workforce struc-
ture ofTCNZ. It seeks explain the type of finn that TCNZ 
has evolved into and bow this has affected its employ-
ment relations (ER} practices. 
Downsizing 
The privatisation of public utilities has been commonly 
linked to downsizing strategies and subsequent worker 
redundancies. Management's response has generally been 
that such workforce reductions are necessary in order for 
ftrms to cut costs and remain competitive in a deregulated 
environment. While simple across the board redundan-
cies may lead to short term cost savings in the form of a 
reduced wages bill, they also raise issues such as the as-
sociated loss of core knowledge and the long term 
sustainability of the ftrm. Studies analysing the medium-
to long-term effectiveness of downsizing strategies tend 
to reveal rather mixed results (see Marks 1993, Cascio 
1993, Cascio et al. 1997; Sebbens 2000}. The direct costs 
of downsizing may include severance payouts and admin-
istrative costs, while indirect costs may include recruit-
ment and employment costs for new employees, lower 
morale amongst remaining workers, heightened job inse-
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curity, training and retraining costs, work intensification 
and lower productivity (University of Colorado study in 
Littler et al. 1997:76). Littler et al discuss how repeated 
downsizing can lead to problems with 'survivor' syndrome 
( 1997 :69-72), while Howard argues that the drive for in-
creased short-term profits by many frrms in the UK dur-
ing the 1990s may have long-term negative effects, as such 
frrms mistake cost-cutting for efficiency ( 1996:66-67). 
Some researchers make the distinction between 'strategic 
downsizing' and 'worker layoffs' (Band & Tustin 1995). 
This research suggests that in order to gain long term ben-
efits from downsizing tirms must take a more strategic 
approach to the above issues, rather then rely on simple 
across-the-board worker layoffs. This accords with a trans-
action costs economics (TCE) analysis which implies that 
better performing tirms will be those that target specific 
workers for redundancies, while redesigning their organi-
sational structures to better retain 'core ' knowledge (see 
Ross 2000). 
Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) 
TCE examines the make/buy decisions of firms. It analy-
ses why firms may retain certain parts of the production 
process in-house while outsourcing other sections to the 
market. Thus TCE provides a possible explanation as to 
why fmns retain certain workers - perhaps as part of a 
reduced core workforce - while making other workers 
redundant. It considers that while the market price for 
outsourced work may be relatively cheaper than produc-
ing the good and/or service inhouse, it may not cover as-
sociated transaction costs. These costs may include lower 
quality goods and services, and the possible loss of intel-
lectual property rights to competing fmns. As the pro-
duction process moves outside the finn it becomes more 
difficult to supervise. This leads to typical principal-agent 
problems such as bounded rationality and asymmetric in-
formation. Outsourcing may also raise difficulties asso-
ciated with legal contracts and issues of control (see 
Williamson 1979, 1985 & 1996 ). Therefore in some situ-
ations it may be cheaper to internalise the production proc-
ess than to externalise it. 
Williamson links ou tsourcing decisions to asset-
speciticity. If a production process is highly firm-spe-
cific and thus related to its core competencies, then TCE 
suggests it should be produced in-house. Conversely, if a 
production process has a low degree of asset-specificity 
then a fmn is more likely to outsource it to the market. 
Therefore, tinns are more likely to outsource generic work 
than fmn-specitic work. Thus, when tinns make deci-
sions concerning outsourcing, production costs form only 
part of the equation. To economise a fmn must minimise 
the sum of production and associated transaction costs 
(Williamson 1979: 245). 
But subcontractors and strategic alliance partners may 
make significant investments in capital equipment and/or 
human resource training that is highly asset-specific-
that is, specific to the project or joint venture. This could 
mitigate against principal-agent problems, as both parties 
have a strong financial incentive to maintain the alliance. 
This is supported by Asanuma 's researeh on strong manu-
facturer-supplierrelationships in the Japanese car man\1-
facturing industry where subcontractors make large in-
vestments in asset-specific capital goods (1992). 
The decision to outsource may also be affected by s.hort-
and long-term considerations. Firms may choose to sell 
off and/or outsource core competencies for short-term 
shareholder gain or political considerations. In this situ-
ation the actions of the firm may not always follow the 
path suggested by TCE, however, the theory helps to ex-
plain the possible long-term costs to the firm of such strat-
egies. 
From an ER point of view, a frrm wishing to reduce its 
staffing level may achieve this by across-the-board redun-
dancies, but it may also lose some talented employees 
who have received a high degree of in-house training. In 
other words, there has been a high degree of investment 
in human-capital in these employees that is ftrm-specific 
(Williamson 1979:240). Given the costs associated with 
this investment and the associated possible loss of 'core' 
knowledge, a more rational decision is for ftrms to target 
for redundancy those employees with little training and 
few in-house skills- that is, those employees with a low 
degree of asset-speciticity. Work requiring employees 
with generic skills can usually be accessed through 
outsourcing, sub-contracting or the part-time labour mar-
ket. 
Therefore, TCE suggests that frrms will tend to retain 
employees with frrm-specific skills, while those with less 
fmn-specitic skills will be shifted out to subcontractors. 
Employees with generic skills will tend to move into sub-
contract and/or casual employment. As ftrms reduce the 
size of their core workforce they may increasingly rely on 
subcontractors and strategic alliances. Firms then must 
learn to manage these external relationships. From a TCE 
point of view, the costs of this ' relationship management' 
must be less than the financial gains from outsourcing if 
such strategies are to be effective (see Reve 1990: 138). 
This paper examines how well the strategies undertaken 
at TCNZ appear to fit the TCE scenario. 
The Telecom New Zealand Group (TCNZ) 
Until the 1980s telecommunications in New Zealand were 
controlled by a government monopoly, the New Zealand 
Post Office. In line with the large-scale reforms insti-
tuted by the government during this period, the post of-
fice was broken up and a state owned enterprise (SOE), 
the Telecom Corporation of New Zealand, was formed in 
1987. In 1990 TCNZ was fully privatised. The major 
shareholders, Bell Atlantic and Ameritech, were both US 
owned multinational corporations (MNCs) (TCNZ 1997). 
Following almost a decade of substantial profits and in-
creasing share prices, Bell Atlantic and Ameritech, di-
vested their shares in TCNZ in 1998 - it had been a 
profitable investment for both companies. 
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Substantial downsizing has occurred at TCNZ. Between 
1987 and 1990, when TCNZ operated as a SOE, employee 
numbers were reduced from 24 500 to 16 000 (TCNZ 
annual reports). After privatisation, in 1990, employee 
numbers were again reduced. By 2000 TCNZ employed 
less than 6000 full-time workers (TCNZ 2000). The tinn 
was assisted in its ability to implement such large scale 
restructuring and employee layoffs by the introduction of 
the Employment Contracts Act (ECA) in 1991. This Act 
radically changed the industrial relations system that had 
been based on centrally determined award rates of pay 
and conditions. This was replaced with a decentralised 
system of individual or collective contracts. The Com-
munications and Electrical Workers Union (CE~U). the 
former major union at TCNZ, found it difficult to operate 
in this new envirorunent and in 1995 it went into liquida-
tion. 
Organisational Structure and Strategies 
In the late 1980s TCNZ was perceived as being overstaffed 
and employee reductions were largely achieved through 
across the board redundancies (interviews with CEWU 
and TCNZ management). Therefore. to a large extent 
many redundancies do not appear to have been targeted 
at this time. Large reductions in employee numbers were 
achieved initially through relatively attractive redundancy 
payments, however, these were reduced in later years. 
After privatisation in 1990 the nature of the group ·s or-
ganisational structure became quite t1uid. New functional 
divisions and subsidiaries were formed, while other sec-
tions were sold or reabsorbed back into the group. Inter-
views with former union officials suggest that CEWU of-
ficials had trouble keeping track of this changing struc-
ture. Throughout this period, however. TCNZ continued 
to reduce the size of its permanent workforce. 
During the early 1990s TCNZ's management saw its or-
ganisational structure as being too cumbersome and lack-
ing the flexibility required to operate in the newly 
deregulated telecommunications environment. Therefore. 
management decided to decentralise the organisation and 
the firm was divided into a number of semiautonomous 
regional divjsions. Cost reduction strategies included re-
dundancies, outsourcing and the introduction of new tech-
nologies. 
With the introduction of the ECA ( 199 1 ). TCNZ man-
agement began to aggressively push for individual con-
tracts for its workers. Internal reports state that TCNZ 
'has a strategic objective to move towards individual con-
tracts with all employees' (TCNZ 1995:4). TCNZ ar-
gued that it wished to forge bener relationships with its 
employees through direct negotiations, but management 
have been quite open about their desire to remove ' third 
parties' - i.e. unions - from the workplace. To some 
degree the new decentralised structure assisted manage-
ment in this regard. TCNZ management refused to bar-
gain for one collective agreement to cover all workers. 
but did agree to bargain for smaller separate agreements 
in the decentralised regional divisions. 
The decentralised structure introduced the concept of 
TCNZ work being internally and externally contestable. 
Regional divisions could compete against each other for 
work being tendered by the TCNZ's head office, with 
much of this work also being contestable in the open mar-
ket. This tended to foster a more competitive environ-
ment, which drove prices down. But it also placed a high 
degree of pressure on middle management within the re-
gional divisions to benchmark the performance of their 
sections and reduce costs. Thus, areas within the fmn 
were induced to become ' leaner ' and operate with lower 
overheads. This in turn increased the number of redun-
dancies as sections strove to reduce short-te rm costs. 
Sections not performing to budget tended to disappear, 
with their role outsourced to an external party. 
Until the mid- 1990s TCNZ appeared to retain a relatively 
small numbers of skilled technicians within their various 
entities to keep prices down. Rather than sub-contracting 
all technical work to the marketplace, these entities re-
tained enough technicians to bid for perhaps 25 to 50 per 
cent of such work from TCNZ. A combination of low 
overheads and aggressive bidding meant that these TCNZ 
entities could offer competitive bids to help drive down 
the prices of external sub-contractors. Union officials 
suggested that while TCNZ no longer had the capacity. or 
desire, to perform all its technical work. its various enti-
ties retained the ability to affect market prices through 
competitive tendering. However, it appears that such strat-
egies also lowered morale as technical workers became 
increasingly concerned about job security. By the late 
1990s TCNZ seemed to have moved away from this policy, 
with further downsizing leading to more of this technical 
~ ~ 
work simply being outsourced. This change in strategy 
may have been influenced by the increase in the number 
of external contractors now bidding for TCNZ work. The 
creation of such a highly contestable market tends to con-
trol prices. 
The union found it difficult to keep up with all of the many 
changes. For example, in the early 1990s "TCNZ set up a 
new company for PABX installat ion. paid all the existing 
staff their redundancy payments (about NZ$25 million) 
and then rehired many of them the next day on individual 
contracts' (CEWU 1996: 16). It then becan1e difficult for 
the CEWU to organise former TCNZ employees who had 
been rehired by relatively small subcontractor tinns. 
By the mid- 1990s the regional structure had been aban-
doned and TCNZ 's organisational structure was again 
centralised. But in terms of worker numbers this was a 
far smaller tinn than had begun the decade. By the late 
1990s TCNZ had a functional divisional structure sup-
ported by subsidiaries. subcontractors and strategic all i-
ances. TCNZ was divided into two main groups, Telecom 
Networks and Telecom services. These two groups con-
tained business units, which administered the operating 
capacity and service requirements of the group. TCNZ 
also owned the subsidiaries. ConnecTel - formally the 
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functional division, Network, Design and Construction-
and Telecom Directories. 
Much of the technical support services work in the tel-
ecommunications sector was shifted to ConnecTel. There-
fore many technical workers were no longer employed by 
TCNZ as they had become ConnecTel employees. While 
this wholly owned subsidiary provided technical support 
services in the telecommunications sector, it was not guar-
anteed TCNZ work. Rather, it was also expected to bid 
for other work within the New Zealand telecommunica-
tions sector (interviews with ConnecTel management 
1999). In 2000 TCNZ sold off ConnecTei as a stand-
alone company, while it increased the amount of techni-
cal work that it tendered out to other firms (TCNZ 2000). 
This strategy of shifting technical work out of the core 
company has led to a de-emphasis on technical training. 
While TCNZ was formerly New Zealand 's largest train-
ers of technicians, most of this training has now been left 
to the marketplace. While it has cut costs, with many 
former TCNZ technicians now employed by subcontrac-
tors, it has also raised concerns about the capacity of the 
New Zealand labour market to continue to supply skilled 
technicians in the medium- to long-term. 
During the 1990s redundancies became more targeted. 
Much semi-skilled work, including operator services was 
outsourced. This included directory assistance, national 
and international assistance calls. While the work of op-
erator services can be quite demanding, workers can gen-
erally be trained to perform these functions relatively 
quickly. In 1998 TCNZ negotiated an agreement with 
SITEL Lend Lease to outsource all such work throughout 
New Zealand. Other sections within TCNZ were also 
considering outsourcing areas such as ' help desk' cus-
tomer service operations (TCNZ 1998). 
TCNZ also outsourced its property management and car 
t1eet management, while its purchasing functions were 
increasingly integrated into an ecommerce purchasing 
system. This led to a subsequent reduction in the number 
of permanent staff required for these roles. Recruitment 
of new staff has also been outsourced to a number of ·pre-
ferred ' employment agencies. reducing the need for HRM 
personnel. Rather, many traditional HRM funct ions have 
now been delegated to line management. The corporate 
HRM section sees its role as instituting and coordinating 
company policy and giving advice to line management. 
It does not generally seek to deal directly with TCNZ 
employees. 
ln 1999 TCNZ outsourced its own IT needs to the com-
puting services firm, EDS. This affected about 600 former 
TCNZ workers who had the option of either moving to 
the new firm or resigning. Most of these workers did not 
have redundancy clauses included in their individual con-
tracts (interviews with TCNZ 1999). Given the growing 
relationship between IT and the telecommunications sec-
tor and the subsequent loss of highly skilled staff that this 
move would entail, this may appear to be a somewhat 
curious decision. But interviews suggest that the deei-
sion was seen having the potential to deliver major cost 
cutting benefits - TCNZ also gained a 10 per cent 
shareholding in EDS New Zealand Ltd (TCNZ 2000a). 
By 2000 the transmission of data flows and internet re-
lated applications had become one of TCNZ's largest 
growth areas. During interviews TCNZ management in-
fer that this area is seen as playing a large part in TCNZ's 
future development. To accommodate this growth a TCNZ 
strategy has been to form strategic alliances with other 
fmns in this area, rather than increase the size of its per-
manent workforce. This has included the creation of 
'esolutions' , which involved an alliance with Microsoft 
and EDS. TCNZ is also working with software giant, 
Cisco, to improve its delivery of data requirements and 
has taken a 10 per cent stake in the internet fmn 1NL 
(TCNZ 2000). TCNZ management sees such strategies 
as a cost-effective way of giving the firm a greater stake 
in the converging technology, information, multi-media 
and entertainment (TIME) sectors (TCNZ 2000c). This 
has some similarities with the strategies being taken across 
the Tasman by Telstra (Ross 2000). TCNZ has also moved 
into the Australian market by taking a majority share own-
ership in AAPT and through winning a large IT contract 
with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (TCNZ 
2000b). 
In short, management at TCNZ have been committed to 
extensive restructuring and corporate downsizing, while 
internally and externally contestable markets have main-
tained pressure on TCNZ functional groups to reduce 
costs. Redundancies in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
appear to have been taken across all functional groups in 
a bid to reduce costs across-the-board. But during the 
1990s these redundancies appear to have become more 
targeted. While TCNZ began the 1990s as a relatively 
large stand-alone company, by 2000 it had evolved into a 
smaller core company supported by subcontractors, sub-
sidiaries and strategic alliances. The next section exam-
ines the changing nature of TCNZ's worlcforce in more 
detail. 
Workforce 
Figure l shows that by 1995 much of the decrease in 
TCNZ's permanent workforce had already occurred-
by the mid-l990s it had been reduced to around a third of 
what it had been prior to corporatistion in 1987. But be-
tween 1995 and 1999 TCNZ continued to reduce the size 
its permanent workforce. TCNZ's decision to outsource 
its IT requirements and sell off ConnecTel were also be-
hind the decrease in permanent workers between 1999 
and 2000. Figure 2 shows information technology (IT) 
and information services (IS) to be the only growth areas 
for permanent employment during the latter part of the 
1990s. The largest reductions were in technical and engi-
neering jobs, an area that became increasingly contest-
able in the external market. 
One criticism of downsizing strategies relates to their long-
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term sustainability. Given the extensive downsizing that 
has occurred at TCNZ a salient question is to ask how the 
tinn has continued to operate effectively with this reduced 
workforce? While the introduction of new technologies 
has been a factor, there has also been an increase in the 
use of contractors. While the permanent workforce was 
reduced between 1995-99. the number of workers em-
ployed on a fLXed-term contract basis increased. Figure 3 
shows that the use of such contractors increased across 
all sections of TCNZ's workforce during this period-
from 143 to 1929 workers. 
By 1999 contractors made up more than 20 per cent of 
TCNZ's workforce (see Table l ). While the number of 
permanent sales and marketing workers decreased between 
1995-99, the total number of such workers employed by 
TCNZ increased by 20 per cent during this period, due to 
the increased use of contractors (see Figure 3 ). The large 
increase in the number of IT workers employed by TCNZ 
Figure 3. Use of Contractors 
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The outsourcing of work performed by semi-skilled staff, 
such as. operator services, and the outsourcing of generic 
work, such as. property management and car fleet man-
agement, tits the TCE analysis quite well. Such work has 
a low degree of asset-specificity and the theory suggests 
that there are less transaction costs involved in outsourcing 
this work to the market. 
However. explaining the outsourcing of technical work 
and the shifting of technical workers into subsidiaries, joint 
ventures and stand-alone companies is more problematic. 
Many such workers have developed a high degree of skills 
specific to the New Zealand telecommunications sector. 
A number of factors g ive a possible explanation here. 
Firstly, while the market has theoretically been open to 
competition for the last decade, TCNZ retains the owner-
ship of most of the ftxed line telephone network and still 
controls a large proportion of the New Zealand te lecom-
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was also mainly caused by the employment of more con-
tractors. While the period 1995-99 saw a reduction in the 
overall number of support staff and technical workers, 
Table 1 shows that this was masked to some degree by the 
increased use of contractors in these areas. Interestingly, 
the use of casual and temporary labour was not exploited 
to the same extent. Thus, while the permanent workforce 
was reduced between 1995-99. the total number of work-
ers. including contractors. actually increased. 
Discussion 
How well does the reorganisation/restructure of the 
workforce at TCNZ during the 1990s fit the TCE model? 
munications market. TCNZ has also been prepared to 
engage in protracted legal banles to restrict access to this 
network, - the lack of a specitic industry regulator has 
arguably helped TCNZ in this regard. With a population 
of less then 4 million, New Zealand may also not provide 
the economies of scale that new entrants may require to 
make the large scale investments- and associated sunk 
costs- necessary to seriously challenge TCNZ's market 
dominance. Thus many former TCNZ technical workers 
that now work for subcontractors - i.e. that build and 
maintain the network- are still be doing work commis-
sioned by TCNZ. In this way the ftrm has retained the 
use of these tirm-specific skills at a reduced price. 
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Table 1. Breakdown of TCNZ workforce: 1995-99 
Area Casual Permanent 
1995 1999 1995 1999 
Corporate 29 29 844 584 
Support 
IT / IS 5 418 563 
Sales & 110 59 3,607 3,492 
Marketing 
Technical/ 10 21 3,574 2,598 
Engineering 
Grand Total 149 114 8,443 7,237 
Source: TCNZ interviews and reports 
Another possible explanation for the outsourcing of tech-
nical work is the emphasis that modem markets tend to 
place on short-term profit maximisation. TCNZ's two 
fom1er major shareholders, Bell Atlantic and Ameritech, 
were both US based MNCs that retained control ofTCNZ 
for 8 years. Many cost cutting and downsizing strategies 
were implemented during this period. This in part helped 
to ensure h_igh profits and continual increases in the share 
price. During the 1990s it was not uncommon for 90 per 
cent or more of profits to be repatriated back to the USA 
(TCNZ annual reports). While this paper is not suggest-
ing that the restructure of TCNZ throughout the 1990s 
was entirely for short-term financial gain, the sudden exit 
of the two American firms in 1998 raises questions about 
long term issues, such as, training and reinvestment in 
infrastructure. Interestingly TCNZ's 2000 annual report 
states that future share dividends will be restricted to 50 
per cent of annual net earning, with the remainder being 
reinvested back into the firm. This is a sharp variation 
from previous practices and compares with a share divi-
dend for the year ending June 2000 that represented 98 
per cent of annual net earning (TCNZ 2000:23). 
The outsourcing of TCNZ's internal IT requirements in 
1999 also does not seem to fit the traditional TCE model. 
Again, it could be surmised that such workers would have 
gained a high degree of fmn-specific skills in TCNZ and 
as such should exhibit a relatively high degree of asset-
specificity. The traditional TCE analysis would suggest 
that these workers should be retained. Interviews suggest 
that an emphasis on short-term cost reductions was a ma-
jor reason behind this strategy. Some TCNZ managers 
also suggested that TCNZ had never developed a core 
competency in such IT work, and as such it was better to 
outsource it to 'experts' in the t1eld such as EDS. How-
ever, TCNZ has retained a number of specialised IT work-
ers to overseas such outsourced work for quality control 
purposes - poor quality work being a potential transac-
tion cost. 
But the above strategies may also reflect the labour mar-
ket for the IT industry in general. Table 1 shows that 
during the period 1995-99 TCNZ increased its use of IT 
Contractor Temporary Grand Total 
1995 1999 1995 1999 1995 1999 
9 246 23 32 905 891 
96 547 7 9 521 1,124 
18 918 65 98 3,800 4,567 
20 2 18 2 1 28 3,625 2,865 
143 1,929 116 167 8,851 9,447 
contractors. A general shortage ofiT workers means they 
are often headhunted and hence tend to move between 
different employers depending on the salary package be-
ing offered. The rapidly changing nature of the IT and 
the telecommunications industry also means that ftm1s are 
constantly requiring new/updated skills. These factors 
tend to support an employment system within the indus-
try that favours relatively short-term lucrative contracts, 
rather than the development of long-term skills within the 
same t1rm. This tends to mitigate against the TCE view 
that ftmls will retain these highly skilled workers. 
The use of strategic alliances in the emerging ecommerce 
and intemet sectors also has implications for TCNZ's ER 
practices. These growth markets are increasingly impor-
tant to the flfffi 's future potential revenues, however. many 
of the workers producing this revenue will not be part of 
TCNZ's permanent workforce. Rather they will be em-
ployed by flfffis linked to TCNZ and/or will be employed 
as contractors. This raises the issue of relationship man-
agement and the costs involved in principal-agent rela-
tionships, such as, shirking and quality control. TCE sug-
gests that the success of these alliances will be dependent 
on the investment that each member finn makes to the 
project. The higher the investment in equipment and/or 
services specific to the project, then the greater the desire 
of the member ftrms to ensure that the venture is a suc-
cess. 
TCNZ's ER strategies have also included an aggressive 
push towards the use of individual contracts and the de-
sire to exclude unions from the decision making process. 
In this regard they were assisted to a degree by a con-
servative government and the introduction of the Employ-
ment Contracts Act ( 199 1 ). However, in 2000 a Labour 
government was elected that moved to quickly introduce 
a new Employment Relations Act (2000). This change in 
the external operating environment has implications from 
a TCE analysis. With new labour legislation and a gov-
ernment that is more friendly to union objectives, the costs 
involved in continuing to induce workers away from col-
lective contracts and onto individual contracts may be-
come higher. The Employment Tribunal recently tined 
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TCNZ for failing to award performance pay rises to four 
technicians because they hadn't signed individual con-
tracts (EPMU 2000). 
Conclusion 
The privatisation of TCNZ led to an increased drive for 
greater profits. As such, its share price continued to grow 
throughout the 1990s. From an investors point of view 
this was a good result. But these increased profi ts were 
ofte n achieved through extensive cost cutting and 
downsizing. The consequences for ER included a large 
reduction in the number of fulltime workers employed at 
TCNZ. However, this workforce is now supported by a 
greater use of subcontractors and external management 
contract s. New growth areas for TCNZ such as 
ecommerce and the internet, are being undertaken by stra-
tegic alliances with other tirms, rather than by employing 
more TCNZ employees. Thus. while TCNZ may expand 
into these new markets, it will not necessarily lead to any 
increases in TCNZ's fulltime workforce. Rather, TCNZ 
has evolved into a relatively small ' lean' operation, sup-
ported by links to other firms and contractors. Interviews 
and empirical evidence suggest that this process will con-
tinue. 
TCE provides some support for the TCNZ model, in par-
ticular the outsourcing of less skilled and generic work. 
But other actions undertaken by the fmn, such as, moves 
towards shifting skilled workers into subsidiaries. joint 
ventures and stand-alone companies, require the consid-
eration of other variables. These include the drive for 
short-term profits. the nature of the labour market for dif-
ferent groups of skilled workers; TCNZ's ownership of 
much of the tixed line telecommunications infrastructure; 
and the nature of new technologies and the rapidly chang-
ing telecommunications market. The evolution ofTCNZ's 
organisational structure during the 1990s would appear 
to accord with Reve 's view that fums will become a func-
tion of their strategic core and their strategic alliances 
(1990: 138 ). 
Future Research 
This research is part of a longitudinal study that is exam-
ining workforce restructuring in the New Zealand and 
Australian telecommunications sector since deregulation. 
The strategies undertaken by TCNZ and Telstra during 
this period exhibit many similarities. This suggests that 
these tirms are aiming to create somewhat similar organi-
sational models that they believe are more suited to 
deregulated telecommunications sectors. A number of 
governments in the Asia-Pacific are also currently 
deregulating their te lecommunications markets. There-
fore , it is hoped that future research can examine the strat-
egies being undertaken by these other former government 
owned telecommunication 's monopolies to see how they 
compare with the strategies undertaken by TCNZ and 
Telstra. 
Notes 
I 'Survivor' syndrome is generally associated, with 
lower morale and productivity caused by work 
intensification and increased job insecurity amongst 
those workers left in the organisation after the farm 
has downsized. 
2 Asymmetric information: a situation in which one 
side of an economic relations hip has better 
information than the other (Katz & Rosen 1991 :595). 
3 Asset specificity may be defmed as the ease to which 
an asset may be transferred to its next best alternative 
use. 
4 EDS was formally a New Zealand government 
owned computing services centre before it was 
privatised in the 1990s. 
5 Court action between TCNZ and its rival CLEAR 
Communications over access to the fixed line 
network was appealed a ll the way to the Privy 
Council in the UK without a successful resolution 
(see Ahdar 1995). 
6 However , a government inquiry in 2000 
recomme nded the creation of a n Electronic 
Communications Commissioner to overseas the 
industry. 
7 I greatly appreciate the cooperation offered by TCNZ 
staff and management, ConnecTel staff and manage-
ment, former officials from the CEWU, present of-
ficials of the EPMU and executive members of the 
CTU. 
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